Important. This article describes Swiss nominee-director liability in general terms. It is not legal advice. Each engagement depends on its specific facts and requires case-by-case assessment before acceptance.
Interior stair and handrail in a Swiss office building
Every corporate entrance lands at the same place: a Swiss director whose statutory duties do not depend on what the engagement letter says.

The nominee director illusion

Foreign owners routinely describe the Swiss-resident director they engage as "nominal" or "for the register only". Swiss corporate and tax law does not recognise that description. The Swiss Code of Obligations imposes one set of statutory duties on every member of the board of directors. Those duties attach by registration, not by negotiation. A director who has never attended a board meeting, who has never seen the company's bank statements, and who has signed no document other than the engagement letter itself still answers to shareholders, creditors, the company, the social-security authority, and the tax administration on the terms the Code sets out.

The practical consequence is that the question for a foreign owner is not whether the nominee director has liability but what that liability looks like when a specific problem surfaces, and for the nominee director it is not whether to accept the engagement but on what terms and with what ongoing due-diligence practice.

The statutory resident-representative requirement

The reason the nominee arrangement exists is Article 718 paragraph 4 of the Code of Obligations for the AG and Article 814 paragraph 3 for the GmbH. Both provide that the company must be capable of being represented by a person domiciled in Switzerland. In an AG that person must be a member of the board of directors or an executive officer (Direktor) and must have access to the share register; in a GmbH, a managing officer (Geschäftsführer) or Direktor with access to the register of quota holders. Swiss citizenship is not required. The requirement is the driving reason foreign-held entities engage a resident director in the first place and is met only by a genuine registration, not by an address-of-convenience arrangement.

Duties of care and loyalty under CO Art. 717

Every member of the board of directors must carry out their duties with the care expected of a prudent business person (devoir de diligence, Sorgfaltspflicht) and safeguard the interests of the company in good faith (devoir de fidélité, Treuepflicht). These duties are codified in Article 717 of the Code. They are objective standards against which a director's conduct is measured; they do not depend on the director's actual knowledge of the company's affairs and are not reduced by an agreement that the director will act only on instructions from the owners.

In operational terms, the duty of care requires a director to keep themselves informed of the company's financial position, to raise the over-indebtedness alert under Art. 725 ff. when warranted, to ensure that statutory accounting and audit obligations are met, and to supervise any persons to whom executive functions are delegated. The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing without disclosure and informed consent and requires the director to act in the interest of the company rather than that of any single shareholder, including a shareholder who engaged them.

Notarial deed cover on a desk
The public deed of incorporation names the first board of directors. What the appointment signs the director up to is not negotiable between the parties.

Personal liability under CO Art. 754

Article 754 of the Code of Obligations is the central liability provision. It states that members of the board of directors and all persons engaged in the business management or liquidation are liable both to the company and to the individual shareholders and creditors for any damage caused by intentional or negligent breach of their duties. Three categories of claimant can therefore pursue a Swiss director personally:

Where several persons are liable for the same damage, each is jointly and severally liable with the others only to the extent the damage is personally attributable to them by reason of their own fault and the circumstances (Art. 759 CO). The limitation period is three years from the date the claimant learned of the damage and the identity of the liable person, and in any event ten years from the day the damaging conduct occurred or ceased. Where that conduct is a criminal offence, the claim does not become time-barred before criminal prosecution does (Art. 760 CO).

Case law from the Federal Supreme Court applies these principles without a discount for directors who hold the seat on someone else's behalf. The register entry carries statutory consequences that no agreement between the director and the owner can exclude. Where management has been validly delegated, a director answers for the care taken in selecting, instructing and supervising the delegate (Art. 754 para. 2 CO). In one of the court's leading decisions, a sole director who stayed passive, did not know the company the director was meant to run, and accepted the manager's own reassurances after learning that the manager was wanted by the police was held liable to the creditors of the bankrupt company. A director who relies solely on owner instructions without independent inquiry stands in the same position.

Joint and several liability for unpaid social-security contributions

Article 52 of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Act (AHVG) makes the employer liable for the loss a compensation office suffers through intentional or grossly negligent disregard of the contribution rules. Where the employer is a legal person, the members of the board of directors and all persons engaged in its management or liquidation are liable subsidiarily, and jointly and severally among themselves, for unpaid AHV (social security) contributions that the company has withheld from employee wages or owes as employer. The same regime applies to IV (disability) and EO (loss of earnings) contributions through Art. 66 of the Federal Disability Insurance Act and Art. 21 of the Loss of Earnings Compensation Act. The claim arises once the contributions cannot be recovered from the company itself, and the compensation office asserts it against the director personally by formal ruling (Art. 52 para. 4 AHVG).

For a foreign-owned Swiss entity with employees, AHVG Art. 52 exposure is the most frequent real-world liability a nominee director faces. Unpaid contributions compound quickly in bankruptcy, and the amounts can outstrip any director's annual nominee fees by one or two orders of magnitude. Under settled Federal Supreme Court case law, once the compensation office has established a loss caused by unpaid contributions, it may assume at least gross negligence unless the director proves grounds of justification or exculpation. The care required is graded by the director's position: the sole board member of a small company with a simple structure must keep an overview of all material matters, payroll contributions included, even after delegating management, and cannot delegate that responsibility along with the management.

AMLA scope for the professional nominee

The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) reaches the professional nominee by two routes. Acting as a director or other officer of a domiciliary company, meaning an entity that runs no trading, manufacturing or other commercial business, is financial intermediation under Article 2 paragraph 3 AMLA read with Article 6 paragraph 1 letter d of the Anti-Money Laundering Ordinance (AMLO). Since 1 October 2026, Article 2 paragraph 3bis AMLA also covers advisers who professionally take part, for third parties, in transactions connected with forming non-operating Swiss entities or entities seated abroad, managing and administering non-operating entities, and contributions to and distributions from them; providing a domicile or seat for more than six months is covered by paragraph 3ter. Board functions for operating companies are excluded (Article 2 paragraph 4ter letter f AMLA), so a directorship of a family-owned trading company with a real business is not in scope. The activity is professional once any AMLO threshold is crossed: gross revenue above CHF 50,000 a calendar year, more than 20 business relationships (for advisers, more than 20 clients or legal transactions) a year, assets of others above CHF 5 million, or transactions above CHF 2 million a year (Articles 7 and 12f AMLO). A practitioner in scope must join a FINMA-recognised self-regulatory organisation (SRO) (Article 14 AMLA); direct FINMA supervision is not an option for this activity.

For nominees in scope, the AMLA obligations include KYC identification of beneficial owners, documentation of the economic background of transactions, ongoing monitoring of the business relationship, and reporting suspicious activity to the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS). For how SRO supervision compares with FINMA prudential supervision, see our companion article on SRO membership vs FINMA prudential supervision.

POEM, tax substance, and the reasoned directorship

A nominee director who issues rubber-stamp resolutions from Switzerland while the substantive decisions are taken in London, Dubai or Singapore creates a tax-residence problem as well as a liability problem. Under Swiss domestic tax law a company is resident if its seat or its actual management is in Switzerland (Art. 50 DBG), and the place-of-effective-management (POEM) tests in Swiss double-tax treaties settle dual residence by where the actual management is conducted. A Swiss-registered entity whose board meetings are held remotely and whose decisions are made abroad is vulnerable to a challenge by the foreign tax authority claiming residence in the owner's jurisdiction, with withholding-tax and corporate-tax consequences.

The implication for nominee directorships is that substance must be real. Board meetings should be held in Switzerland and attended by the Swiss-resident director with enough preparation to make the decisions on the table meaningful. Minutes should record the director's contribution, not merely recite a resolution from abroad. Banking relationships, signature authorisations, and correspondence should route through the Swiss director rather than around them.

Numbered corporate folders on a shelf
The nominee director's file is contemporaneous, not retrospective. The record either exists when challenged or it does not.

Engagement-letter clauses that limit but do not eliminate liability

A properly drafted engagement letter between a Swiss director and a foreign owner cannot exclude the director's statutory duties or the third-party liabilities that attach to them. What it can do is allocate the risk internally between the contracting parties. Typical clauses include:

None of these devices replaces the director's personal obligation to perform the role. They provide financial recourse if the director's correct performance nevertheless results in liability, and they create a paper trail showing that the director took the engagement seriously enough to negotiate meaningful terms.

When to refuse a nominee engagement

Certain fact patterns are red flags that should end the engagement discussion before it starts. The following list is not exhaustive and, within it, several items are independently disqualifying:

For the professional nominee in AMLA scope, refusal follows from the due-diligence duties, which require the contracting party to be identified and the beneficial owner to be established and verified when the relationship is taken up (Articles 3 and 4 AMLA). In every case it keeps the portfolio of accepted engagements within personal liability tolerance.

How Switzerland Firma structures nominee engagements

Our nominee-director service is built around the statutory reality. Every engagement starts with a KYC and source-of-funds exercise, a documented business plan review, and a fee structure that funds real quarterly board meetings with minuted discussion. The resident-representative requirement under CO Art. 718 para. 4 (for the AG) and Art. 814 para. 3 (for the GmbH) is met by a director who performs, not merely by a name on the Zefix extract. For engagements within AMLA scope we operate under SRO supervision with documented KYC, transaction monitoring, and reporting relationships to MROS.

Frequently asked questions

Is a nominee director personally liable in Switzerland?

Yes. Swiss law does not recognise a "nominee director" as a separate status. Every member of the board of directors owes the statutory duties of care and loyalty under Art. 717 of the Code of Obligations and is personally liable under Art. 754 for damage caused by breach of those duties. Liability cannot be excluded by agreement between the director and the owner.

What are the duties of a nominee director under Swiss law?

The duties are identical to those of any other director: to carry out the role with the care of a prudent business person (duty of care), to act in the interest of the company in good faith (duty of loyalty), to keep informed of the company's financial position, to raise the over-indebtedness alert when required under Art. 725 ff., and to supervise any delegated executive functions. These duties are codified in CO Art. 717 and supplemented by the liability regime of Art. 754.

When should I refuse a nominee director engagement?

Refuse when the beneficial owner will not be identified, when source-of-wealth evidence is withheld, when the owner is sanctioned or on a FATF high-risk list, when the proposed activity needs an authorisation the entity lacks, when the owner wants all signature authorities, when the fee is too low to fund actual board work, or when minutes of meetings abroad are substituted for real directorship in Switzerland.

Does the resident director need to be a Swiss citizen?

No. CO Art. 718 para. 4 (AG) and Art. 814 para. 3 (GmbH) require domicile in Switzerland, not Swiss citizenship. The resident person must be able to represent the company, must be a board member or executive officer (Direktor) of an AG, or a managing officer or Direktor of a GmbH, and must have access to the share register or the register of quota holders.

Can an engagement letter exclude the director's liability?

It cannot exclude the director's statutory duties or liabilities toward the company, shareholders, creditors, or the social-security authority. It can provide for an indemnity from the owner in favour of the director for liabilities not arising from the director's own gross negligence or wilful misconduct. This shifts the economic cost rather than removing the legal exposure.

Is a nominee director liable for unpaid social-security contributions?

Yes, subsidiarily to the company and jointly and severally with the other liable officers. Article 52 of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Act makes directors personally liable for unpaid AHV, IV and EO contributions that cannot be recovered from the company, where the loss stems from an intentional or grossly negligent breach of the contribution rules. The Federal Supreme Court presumes at least gross negligence once the loss is established, unless the director proves grounds of justification or exculpation, and expects the sole director of a small company to keep track of payroll contributions even after delegating management.

Does a Swiss nominee director need AMLA authorisation?

Not an authorisation, but membership of a FINMA-recognised SRO once the activity is in scope and professional. Acting as an officer of a domiciliary company is financial intermediation under AMLA Art. 2 para. 3 and AMLO Art. 6 para. 1 let. d, and since 1 October 2026 advisers who form, manage or administer non-operating entities for clients are covered by AMLA Art. 2 para. 3bis. Directorships of operating companies are excluded. A practitioner in scope who crosses an AMLO threshold, such as CHF 50,000 gross revenue or more than 20 relationships a year, must join an SRO; direct FINMA supervision is not available for this activity.

How does POEM affect a nominee directorship?

Place-of-effective-management tests in Swiss domestic law and in double-tax treaties look to where substantive decisions are actually made. A Swiss-registered company whose board meetings are held abroad and whose nominee director merely signs pre-drafted minutes is vulnerable to a residence challenge by the foreign tax authority. Substance requires the director to prepare, attend, and contribute to board meetings held in Switzerland with genuine decision-making content.

What is the limitation period for a CO Art. 754 claim?

Three years from the date the claimant learned of the damage and the identity of the responsible person, and in any event ten years from the day the damaging conduct occurred or ceased, under Art. 760 CO. Where the conduct is a criminal offence, the claim does not become time-barred before criminal prosecution does.

Can a bankruptcy administrator pursue a former nominee director?

Yes. In a Swiss bankruptcy the administration asserts the claims against former directors first (Art. 757 CO). If it waives them, creditors can pursue them, and the company's own claims can be assigned to creditors under Art. 260 of the Federal Act on Debt Collection and Bankruptcy, who then sue in their own name. Former directors remain exposed until the limitation periods of Art. 760 CO expire.